Introduction
We discuss in a game theoretic context managerial intervention directed towards value enhancement in the presence of uncertainty and spillover effects. Two firms face real investment options. Embedded in these are (optional) actions that allow firms to enhance value of their prospects directly (through R&D that improves product attributes or reduces costs, advertisement, etc.) or indirectly through information acquisition (exploratory drilling, marketing research, etc.) Due to spillovers, each firm´s action affects the other firm. In this framework both firms can act strategically and take advantage of the positive spillovers (or take pre-emptive action against the negative spillovers). In equilibrium, the degree of coordination can be higher or lower. The implementation of strategy by each firm can either be implicit, or explicit, i.e., by forming a research joint venture. Each firm must thus decide:
(a) How much to spend for such (R&D, etc.) actions, given the spillover effects and (b) How much from this effort to share with its counterpart if this level can vary. For the first (a tactical) decision we allow for a continuous set of alternatives, whereas for the second (a strategic) one we only allow for a discrete set of choices. Let for example a pharmaceutical and a chemical firm trying to enhance the value of their investment prospects, by taking R&D actions to develop new technologies. Each part can learn at least part of the results of the effort of the other for free even if both act on their own. However the two firms will optimize the value of their investment options if they strategically determine the amount of R&D they share (in forming for example a research joint venture and deciding the degree of coordination that will take place and the type of research they will engage in). Another example would be two oil firms that own rights in adjacent oil fields. Knowledge resulting from exploratory drilling could be shared benefiting both.
We adopt the real options framework from the financial economics literature and connect it with the research joint ventures literature of industrial organization. The literature on real options or otherwise irreversible investments under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, and Trigeorgis, 1996) examines the value of flexibility in investment and operating decisions under uncertainty where the traditional net present value (NPV) approach fails. Although the importance of learning actions like exploration, experimentation, and R&D was recognized early on (e.g., Roberts and Weitzman, 1981) , the real options literature has paid little attention to management´s ability to intervene in order to acquire more information and/or enhance value. Majd and Pindyck (1989) , and Pennings and Lint (1997) examine real options with passive learning, while Childs, et al. (1999) , and Epstein, et al. (1999) use a filtering approach towards learning. Recently, Sundaresan (2000) emphasizes the need for adding an incomplete information framework to real options valuation problems.
Although many state-variables are usually treated as observable, it is often more realistic to assume that they are only estimates of quantities that will be actually observed or realized later. Martzoukos (2000) considers true value as a random variable with a known probability distribution. He examines real options with controlled jumps of random size (random controls) to model intervention of management as intentional actions with uncertain outcome (learning) . He assumes that sequential actions are independent of each other. Martzoukos and Trigeorgis (2000) extend this framework to one with path-dependent actions in order to explain the learning behavior of the (single) firm. They demonstrate that activating learning actions before an investment decision is made, is the solution to an optimization problem that actually captures the trade-off between learning early and paying a cost for it, or leaving information to reveal itself ex-post at a potential cost (of exercising seemingly profitable investment options that actually have a negative NPV, or leaving seemingly unprofitable investment options to expire unexercised when they actually have a positive NPV). We adopt this random controls methodology to examine in a game theoretic framework the behavior of two firms in the existence of spillovers.
Real options papers in a game-theoretic context are Grenadier (1996) with strategic option exercise in real asset markets, where development might be sequential; Williams (1993) with symmetric and simultaneous exercise strategies for real estate developers; and Smit and Ankum (1993) with an exogenously determined set of alternative corporate strategies. In this paper the interaction that results in a game theoretic framework comes from the existence of spillovers (in marketing research, R&D, etc.), and the incomplete information from the uncertain outcome of the firm´s actions. The importance of intra-industry spillovers has been documented in the literature. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) for example emphasize the importance of learning spillovers in agriculture, and Carey and Bolton (1996) argue that collusion in advertisement can be successful due to significant spillovers from generic advertising. Spillover effects are significant even among different sectors, as discussed in Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) and Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) , and among different countries, as postulated in Thompson (2000) . Branstetter (1996) investigates the US and Japan to see whether technological externalities are more international or intranational in scope and finds more support for the latter, while Johnson and Evenson (1999) investigating 14 less developed or developing countries find empirical evidence that both international and interindustrial R&D spillovers can be significant.
Managers may have some control over spillover effects by deciding on the extent of R&D coordination without necessarily colluding in the product markets (i.e., semi-collusion to use the term in Fershtman and Gandal, 1994, Brod and Shivakumar, 1999, etc.) They can decide their strategy for the optimal degree of coordination by taking properly into consideration the benefits of R&D/learning investments. Different strategies of coordination include research joint ventures (RJV) and non-equity co-development (COD) according to the access the firms have to the innovation (see for example Tao and Wu, 1997) . The seminal theoretic model of R&D choice in the presence of spillovers under various structures in the product market is d´Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) . Here the degree of spillover is the same. In Kamien et.al. (1992) the degree of spillovers varies. Firms can either coordinate in R&D or engage in information sharing by forming an RJV. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) recommends that firms endogenously determine the optimal degree of spillovers. In all papers firms operate in the same product market, and authors search for symmetric equilibria.
In our paper, the choice of the level of spillovers is endogenously determined. For purposes of analytic tractability, we focus on the case where the firms do not compete in the product market (i.e., they have monopoly power over their investment option). Since firms operate in different product markets, we allow for asymmetric equilibria in the degree of spillovers between the firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first demonstrate the model for controlled learning, the framework for the tactical (resource allocation) decision with continuous choices, and the strategic (coordination) decision with a discrete set of choices. The next section presents an application with numerical results and discussion, and the final section concludes. In what follows, pre-investment management actions are intended to either enhance value directly (traditional R&D for attribute improvements or cost reduction, but also advertisement, etc.) or, in the presence of incomplete information about unobservable variables that influence the decision-making process, enhance value indirectly with efforts to resolve or at least reduce uncertainty (i.e., exploration, pharmaceutical experimentation, but also marketing research, etc.)
The real option game with incomplete information, multiplicative controls, and spillovers.
We consider costly R&D (control) actions of which the outcome will be observed instantaneously. We classify them into two types, pure learning control actions with the sole purpose of information acquisition, and impact control actions with a direct value enhancement (or similarly a cost reduction) purpose. Ex ante we simply know the probability distribution of the outcome, thus we call them random controls. The type of impact control is the most obvious one. Advertisement, process improvement, product attribute enhancement, etc., are actions that result directly in adding value, increasing sales volume and/or price per item, enhancing market share, or reduce production costs. In contrast, pure learning actions are intended to improve the information about (but not to directly affect) a quantity, potential sales price, etc. Exploratory drilling for example will improve information about the value of an oil field, and marketing research will help to better assess market share, etc. Learning actions are thus activated when a parameter significant for the decision making process is estimated with error. Management intends to eliminate or at least reduce this error in order to make optimal investment decisions.
If uncertainty is fully resolved, exercise of an investment option on stochastic asset S* with exercise cost X yields S* -X. Has a learning action not been taken before the investment decision is made, resolution of uncertainty (learning) would occur ex post. Ex ante, the investment decision must be made based solely on expected (instead of actual) outcomes. In this case exercise of the real option is expected to provide E[S*] -X. The real investment prospect is a claim contingent on S = E[S*], and we assume that E[S*] follows a geometric Brownian motion, just like S*. Thus, S will follow the same process before and after learning. Consider for example the case where the underlying asset is a product of two variables, a stochastic but observable one, and a constant but unobservable one. We seek to learn about the unobservable entity, and in doing so we will not affect the stochastic process of the product of the two. At learning, we will simply revise our estimate of the product (which will occur as a jump). Fully revealing learning actions are designed to resolve uncertainty completely (assuming this is feasible), but in the most general case partly revealing actions will be employed either because complete resolution of uncertainty is infeasible, or it is too costly. Each firm faces an investment decision, and either S = E[S*] is common for both (or simply differs by a constant), or each firm´s claim is contingent on a different asset, simply necessitating separate notation for S 1 and S 2 which again follow geometric Brownian motions.
We assume that each underlying asset (project) value, S, subject to i optional (and often costly) controls, follows a stochastic process of the form:
where µ is the instantaneous expected return (drift) and σ the instantaneous standard deviation, dZ R is an increment of a standard Wiener process in the real probability measure, and dq i is a jump counter for managerial activation of action i --a control (not a random)
variable. Under risk-neutral valuation, the asset value S follows the process
where r is the riskless rate of interest, while the parameter δ represents any form of a "dividend yield" (e.g., in McDonald and Siegel, 1984 , δ is a deviation from the equilibrium required rate of return, while in Brennan, 1991, δ is a convenience yield). As in Constantinides (1978) we need to assume that an intertemporal capital asset pricing model as in Merton (1973) holds. As in Merton (1976), we assume the jump (control) risk to be diversifiable (and hence not priced).
For each control i, we assume that the distribution of its size, 1 + k i , is log-normal, i.e., ln(1 + k i ) ~ N(γ i -.5 assumed independent of the Brownian motion --although in a more general setting it can be dependent on time and/or the value of S. In general we can assume any plausible form, but the log-normality assumption will allow analytic tractability. Stochastic differential equation (1a) can alternatively be expressed in integral form as:
(2)
Conditional on control activation
and if the control is a pure learning (information acquisition) action ( i
Each firm's management seeks to optimally activate the control, so that each firm´s claim F on the underlying asset must satisfy (subject to the actions of the other firm) the following optimization problem: The next follows directly from the log-normality assumption of the multiplicative controls.
Proposition 1: Assuming independence between the controls and the increment dZ of the standard Wiener process, the conditional solution to the European call option is given by:
The present value of the risk-neutral expectation E [.] conditional on activation of the controls at t = 0, is isomorphic to the Black-Scholes (1973) model:
The N(d) denotes the cumulative standard normal density evaluated at d. The degree of spillovers (parameter) f is shown more clearly later and may differ between firms. A control can be activated intentionally due to the manager´s learning activity, or unintentionally due to a spillover effect from the actions of the other firm´s management. For the first player, impact, learning, and spillover parameters with subscript one define results of own actions, and with subscript two the spillover effects. The opposite holds for the other firm. Given activation of learning controls, the (risk-neutral) probability P(S T > X) that the call option will be exercised at maturity T equals N(d 2 ). At the moment of activation of the controls and due to the controls only, the probability that the new value of S will exceed some value X equals N(d 2 ) with T → 0, since the outcome of the controls is observed instantaneously. Finally the cost of controls must be subtracted from the conditional real option value for each firm. In pure learning actions intended just to resolve uncertainty about the true value of the unobservable variable S* the impact parameters γ i = 0. In the most general R&D case the impact parameters would differ from zero, and they can be positive if they affect own revenues or negative if they affect fixed or variable costs. The spillover impact to the other player can have either sign.
The Tactical Resource AllocationDecision.
The two managers must solve their optimization problem simultaneously, seeking thus an equilibrium in this (tactical) decision (see Figure 1 ). Let us denote with β 1 and β 2 the cost (effort) of the first and the second firm´s actions. The impact on option value is a function of that cost. Given the actions β 2 of the second firm, the impact on the net option value of firm one equals F 1 (β 1 | β 2 ) -β 1 , and given β 2 the first firm must maximize F 1 -β 1 through the first order condition
Similarly, firm two conditional on the first firm´s action β 1 must maximize F 2 (β 2 | β 1 ) -β 2 through the first order condition
The first order conditions are necessary for the existence of a maximum. Furthermore, if the second order conditions (that the second derivative is negative) are satisfied everywhere (or at least in some admissible range), this maximum, is unique (in the admissible range).
As shown in Figures 1(b) and 1(a), the optimal cost effort functions β 1 * (β 2 ) and β 2 * (β 1 ) for each firm are depended on the other firm's actual effort. In this duopolistic game, both firms optimize their actions simultaneously and the equilibrium solution pair β 1 ** and β 2 ** is shown in Figure 1 (c) at the intersection of β 1 * (β 2 ) and β 2 * (β 1 ). Since the cost efforts β 1 and β 2 affect F 1 and F 2 through the impact (γ i ) and learning ( i C σ ) parameters, we must define the mappings β 1 (γ 1 , 1 2 C σ ) and β 2 (γ 2 , 2 2 C σ ). As will be seen in the examples presented later, it is more intuitive to optimize directly with respect to the learning (or the impact) parameter.
In order to solve numerically these two equations in the most general case, the 2x2 Jacobian matrix of the 2 nd order analytic derivatives is needed and an iterative two-dimensional Newton-Raphson scheme is implemented.
Lemma 1:
The equilibrium efforts of the tactical decision are invariant to identically proportional changes in the price of the underlying asset S, the exercise price X, and the cost β of the control. The constant of proportionality may differ between the two players.
Proof: It is easy to verify through the use of equations (6) -(6a) that the property of option prices to be homogenous of degree one in the underlying asset and the exercise price, is also preserved in this game theoretic context, due to the multiplicative nature of the random control. With the proper choice of the cost function, the conditional option prices (for each player) can be homogeneous of degree one in the underlying asset, the exercise price, and the control's cost θ j , as clearly seen in equations (10a, b) and (12a, b).
The Strategic Coordination Decision.
We now must consider the strategic coordination choice. Firms must decide on the optimal degree of coordination of their R&D efforts. For example, in a 2x2 game, each firm can decide to exert high (H) or low (L) coordination effort (see Figure 2 ). The degree of coordination determines the extent of spillover effects (through the parameter f), and potentially the cost of R&D. We assume for ease of exposition two strategies available for each player, but more than two or even a continuous set of alternatives could exist. The choice sets (H, H), (H, L), etc. uniquely determine the degree of spillover effects. The optimal choice for the two firms is provided by the pure Nash equilibrium(a), or alternatively the mixed strategies equilibrium. Equilibria off the diagonal can occur because of the asymmetry in the direct spillover effects and the cost reduction results of coordination. This is justifiable when the two firms operate in different product markets, and can be for example technology dependent. The solution to the tactical decision in Figure 1 is nested to the solution of the strategic one in Figure 2 .
Proposition 2: If the constant of proportionality (as discussed in lemma 1) is the same for both players, then the Nash equilibrium strategy is invariant to the choice of this constant.
Applications and numerical results: The pure learning case and the impact control case.
Let us first consider an example of pure learning actions. Two companies face an investment opportunity each. Before they decide to invest they also have the option to invest in order to acquire information (like in the case of oil exploration, marketing research, etc.) about the true value of the investment. Thus, both impact parameters equal zero since they do not pursue to directly enhance value but they do so indirectly by reducing uncertainty. We assume a cost function with the information revelation potential bounded from above (as well as positive). We consider i (= 1, 2) pure learning actions (γ i = 0), one from each player j (= 1, 2), with i = j implying the player's action. To find the equilibrium, each player must maximize his/her option value:
given the action of the other player. The parameters f i→j define the degree of spillovers. For the influence of own actions, most often f 1→1 = f 2→2 = 1. The cost is defined for simplicity linear in the variance of the learning action
The strategic decision determines the cost θ and the spillover f parameters.
Finally, the two equations 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
and 2 2 2 2 2 2
are conditional on the other player's move, and must be solved simultaneously. We thus get, 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
and 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 / 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 20 . 5 2 2 2 1 2
After solving for the optimal learning efforts * * 2 * * 2 2 1 and C C σ σ , we find the optimal cost efforts * * 2 * * 1 and β β .
In the application we assume that the optimal learning efforts are below the upper bound for the maximum feasible learning without loss of generality. Else, if the constraint were binding, in the iterative numerical solution we would have to incorporate it explicitly.
In the numerical example we assume that the spillovers are 50% (for 1 → 2) and 25% (for 2 → 1). Tables 1A and 1B show the learning effort and the cost involved for each player.
As we see in Figure 3 As we can see from the following numerical applications, the general form of the response functions is as in Figure 3a with the unique solution at E. Figure 3b presents the case with the unique equilibrium E on the horizontal axis when player 2 gets a free lunch by exerting zero effort and benefiting from the spillovers from the actions of player 1 (symmetrically when player 1 gets the free lunch). These figures indicate the existence of a solution. The uniqueness of this solution depends on the slope and the curvature of the response functions. In Table 2 we see the optimal decisions for a wide variety of asymmetric spillover effects and asymmetric costs. The degree of influence of these parameters on optimal effort is profound. When the underlying investment options and the R&D expenses are symmetric but the spillover effects are not, the player that receives less spillover benefits must spend more on R&D. When the spillover effects are symmetric but the R&D costs are not, the player that faces a steeper cost curve would rather reduce R&D spending, and oftentimes, we encounter free-lunch (almost zero effort on behalf of one player), as the preferred choice.
[Enter Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here]
While Table 2 investigates the case where the two firms face symmetric investment decisions, Table 3 investigates the case where the investment alternative of the first player is expected to be of larger scale than that of the second player, and Table 4 investigates the opposite case.
As a result of Lemma 1, in the example discussed and for each player separately, we can multiply the price of the underlying asset S 1 , the exercise price X 1 , and the cost θ 1 with a positive constant, then multiply S 2 , X 2 , and θ 2 with another positive constant, and the results regarding the equilibrium effort will not change (compare for example the lower third of Table 2 with the middle third of Table 3 ). Optimal option values will of course change by the relevant constant. Figure 4 presents the results from the strategic decision where the two players had to choose the optimal degree of R&D coordination. We see that both decide on the maximum degree of coordination. The first player however, decides not to spend on learning at all (see the results in parenthesis), whereas the second exhibits a very high effort. Figure 5 presents a case where the second player concedes to a high degree and the first to a low degree of coordination. Finally, figure 6 shows a case where the Nash equilibrium is a Low/Low strategy and figure 7 shows a case where the Nash equilibrium is a High/High strategy.
Under no Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies could be considered as an alternative approach, providing the probabilities that each player would play a High or a Low strategy. As a result of Proposition 2, if for the two players the constants of multiplication are the same, then the Nash equilibrium strategy of the games in figures 5-7 will also be unaffected, since all payoffs will be multiplied by the same positive constant.
The case of impact control.
In the previous application we focused on the pure learning (information acquisition) case. If the impact parameters are not zero (a direct effort to enhance value), this case of random control would be similarly solved through the use of the first order conditions (6) and (6a). Again we define each player's option value 2 1 ( )
For the tactical decision we consider the two first order conditions 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 / 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 20 . 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
and 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 ( ) 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 1 2 2 / 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 . 5 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
where the constants s i→j simply guarantee the positivity of the variance components.
Subsequently and similarly with the pure learning case we solve the two equations simultaneously and we get the optimal impact efforts γ 1 ** and γ 2 ** and through them the optimal cost efforts β 1 ** and β 2 ** . Again we can assume that the impact parameters are bounded from above. An example for the cost function 2 ) ( j j j j j f γ θ β → = , with the range of admissible impact parameters bounded below 100% is given in Figure 8 and Tables 4A and   4B (for the solution In Figure 9 the impact spillover is positive (like generic advertisement) whereas in Figure 10 the impact spillover can be negative when advertisement is more competitive and less costly.
Conclusions
This paper presents and solves a real options duopoly game that jointly addresses at the pre-investment stage the strategic decision about the extent of coordination between two firms, and the tactical decision about the optimal effort invested in R&D in the presence of uncertainty and spillover effects. We assume that the two firms can influence each other´s decision at the pre-investment stage, whereas at the investment decision each firm has monopoly power over its investment and there is no further interaction between the two.
Managers want to enhance value and to resolve (or reduce) uncertainty of real (investment) opportunities, before they make a commitment. Learning actions are treated as controlled jumps of random size whose realization is a random variable with a known probability distribution. We used a contingent claims framework with incomplete information and costly control actions, and without use of generality or any sacrifice in insights gained we made the assumption that the two firms face investment opportunities of the European type, allowing thus the use of analytic models isomorphic to Black and Scholes (1973) . Alternatively, fully numerical methods like lattice or numerical solutions to partial differential equations could 20 have been used, but the iterative solution to this continuous game would have been much more intensive computationally and less accurate.
Finally, the solution to the firms' optimal strategic and tactical R&D decision-making is found as the equilibrium of a two-stage game. This decision, as expected, is heavily dependent on the learning potential of R&D investments, their cost, and the degree of coordination that is optimal for the two players. Some times high coordination and other times low coordination will be optimal for each player. The degree of coordination affects both the degree of spillovers, and the parameters of the cost function. There are cases where a player will delegate research by agreeing on a high degree of coordination (lowering thus the R&D cost of the other player) and reap through the spillovers the rewards. In general we can say that, as we have shown, optimal coordination and optimal investment in information acquisition and value enhancement are essential for optimal investment decision-making. Notes (for 1A and 1B). Investment options' parameters are: underlying assets S 1 = S 2 = 100.00, exercise prices X 1 = X 2 = 100.00, dividend yields δ 1 = δ 2 = 0.10, riskless rate r = 0.10, standard deviation of the continuous change of the underlying assets σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.10, time to maturity for both options T = 1.00, and costs of learning (per unit of variance) θ 1 = 100.00 and θ 2 = 75.00 with spillover of learning 50% (for 1 → 2) and 25% (for 2 → 1). Notes. First number for player 1 and second for player 2. S 1 = X 1 = 100.00 and S 2 = X 2 = 100.00. Other real investment option parameters as in Tables 1A and 1B . * Due to the symmetry of the assumptions for the two players, the response functions coincide and this point is approximated at the limit from Notes. First number for player 1 and second for player 2. S 1 = X 1 = 100.00 and S 2 = X 2 = 75.00. Other real investment option parameters as in Tables 1A and 1B . * Due to the relative symmetry of the assumptions for the two players, the response functions coincide and this point is approximated at the limit from Notes. First number for player 1 and second for player 2. S 1 = X 1 = 75.00 and S 2 = X 2 = 100.00. Other real investment option parameters as in Tables 1A and 1B .
Figure 1 Game with Spillovers: Tactical Resource Allocation Decision
Notes: β 1 , β 2 are the learning costs incurred by the two firms, F 1 (β 1 | β 2 ), F 2 (β 2 | β 1 ) are the investment option values before learning costs are subtracted, and β 1 * (β 2 ), β 2 * (β 1 ) are the optimal cost efforts of each player (conditional on the effort of the other). The equilibrium solution pair (β 1 ** , β 2 ** ) is given by the intersection of the two optimal conditional cost effort curves.
Figure 2 Game with Learning Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
Notes: Firms 1 and 2 exhibit a High (H) of Low (L) degree of R&D coordination. F 1 and F 2 are the investment option values (before the cost of investments in coordinated R&D are subtracted). 
Figure 4 Game with Learning Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
Notes: Firms 1 and 2 exhibit a High (H) of Low (L) degree of R&D coordination. The numerical results for the investment option values under optimal effort are presented first (with the Nash equilibrium in bold). Numbers in parenthesis present the players' effort. Below we provide the costs θ 1 and θ 2 , and each player's degree of spillover from the other player's effort. Option parameter values are: S 1 = X 1 = 100.00, S 2 = X 2 = 75.00, dividend yields δ 1 = δ 2 = 0.10, riskless rate r = 0.10, standard deviation of the continuous change of the underlying assets σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.10, time to maturity for both options T = 1.00. 
Figure 5 Game with Learning Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
Figure 6 Game with Learning Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
Figure 7 Game with Learning Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
Notes: Firms 1 and 2 exhibit a High (H) of Low (L) degree of R&D coordination. The numerical results for the investment option values under optimal effort are presented first (with the Nash equilibrium in bold). Numbers in parenthesis present the players' effort. Below we provide the costs θ 1 and θ 2 , and each player's degree of spillover from the other player's effort. Option parameter values are: S 1 = X 1 = 100.00, S 2 = X 2 = 75.00, dividend yields δ 1 = δ 2 = 0.10, riskless rate r = 0.10, standard deviation of the continuous change of the underlying assets σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.10, time to maturity for both options T = 1.00. Notes (for 4A and 4B). Investment options' parameters are: underlying assets S 1 = S 2 = 100.00, exercise prices X 1 = X 2 = 100.00, dividend yields δ 1 = δ 2 = 0.10, riskless rate r = 0.10, standard deviation of the continuous change of the underlying assets σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.10, time to maturity for both options T = 1.00. Costs of impact (per unit of squared impact) θ 1 = 500.00 and θ 2 = 500.00 with spillover of impact 50% (for 1 → 2) and 50% (for 2 → 1). 
Impact induced volatility equals

Figure 9 Game with Impact Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
Notes: Firms 1 and 2 exhibit a High (H) of Low (L) degree of R&D coordination. The numerical results for the investment option values under optimal effort are presented first (with the Nash equilibrium in bold). Numbers in parenthesis present the players' effort. Below we provide the costs θ 1 and θ 2 , and each player's degree of spillover from the other player's effort. Option parameter values are: S 1 = X 1 = 100.00, S 2 = X 2 = 75.00, dividend yields δ 1 = δ 2 = 0.10, riskless rate r = 0.10, standard deviation of the continuous change of the underlying assets σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.10, time to maturity for both options T = 1.00. The impact induced volatility equals for both players 
Figure 10 Game with Impact Spillovers: Strategic Coordination Decision
